Abstract
I. Introduction
Judicial reasoning is puzzling. International judges are often faced with cases where the law runs out or at least becomes murky. Such situations present themselves as problems because it is the image of correctly applying the given law that nurtures judges' social legitimacy. The notion of legalism suggests that judges do their utmost to present their activity as impeccable rule-following, especially when they face or anticipate critique. Legalism refers to a self-perpetuating force of narrow * Associate Professor, University of Amsterdam. I wish to thank Kista Nadakavukaren Shefer, the editors, and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful suggestions and comments.
formalism. At the same time, it might be suggested that judges should use reasons that exceed the more narrow confines of strict formalism, particularly in those situations where the law does not readily give an answer. Such a view is supported from the perspective of discourse theory and its normative reconstruction of the separation of powers. Judicial reasoning should open up to modes of deliberation. Both claims (i.e., that legalism explains a narrow closure of the legal discourse on the one hand and that normative demands require judges to open up the legal discourse on the other hand) cannot coexist, at least not for a long period of time. In the long run, neither claim is plausible if the other holds some sway. 1 The present contribution argues that legalism offers an appealing but ultimately inaccurate view of what drives (international) judges. Legalism's core propositions do not hold across different institutions and for different individual judges. It is not the case that the safe fall-back position of judges is necessarily a narrow formalism. The present contribution argues that a more powerful and more nuanced answer can be developed with a closer view of judges' audiences. 2 More specifically, such a competing answer could build on the concept of self-presentation to better understand why judges reason the way that they do. Theories of self-presentation refine our understanding of what drives judges by drawing attention to social anxiety. Such anxiety arises 'when individuals are motivated to convey a particular impression -usually one that will facilitate interpersonal acceptance (or perhaps more accurately, to avoid interpersonal rejection) but doubt their ability to do so.' 3 Self-presentation manages impressions. In short, the present contribution suggests an understanding of styles of reasoning as a strategy of impression management.
The target of this discussion is not only legalism as a common explanation of judicial reasoning. This contribution also investigates the implications of viewing international judicial behaviour through the lens of judges' audiences for normative arguments. In that regard, this work focuses on the argument from a discourse-theoretical reconstruction of the separation of powers. At its core, such a normative reconstruction demands that juridical discourses be broadened 'to the extent that legal programs are in need of further specification by the courts.' 4 This contribution continues to argue that the additional legitimatory burden that arises with such a broadening of judicial discourses 'could be partly satisfied by additional obligations before an enlarged critical forum specific to the judiciary.' 5 Understanding judicial reasoning as a strategy of impression management credits the role of critical fora by suggesting that judges indeed anticipate critique.
However, this approach ultimately casts doubt on the critical and potentially legitimating role that such a forum might play. Reasons are not expressed to convince or to be backed up in argument but to please an audience whose favour judges seek.
With this line of argument, the contribution wishes to lay further groundwork for an emerging strand of scholarship that studies the styles of reasoning of specific international courts and tribunals across different judicial institutions. 6 In contrast to some of this work-and more generally, in contrast to the largest strand of thought about (international) judicial behaviour-I suggest that the relevant factors that come into consideration should not be limited to the legal and structural constraints of international courts and tribunals. The present contribution argues that a more socialpsychological perspective must be added. This approach thrives above all on one simple proposition:
'judges, like other people, get satisfaction from perceiving that other people view them positively.'
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Judges care about the way they are seen in the eyes of their audiences. This consideration adds to the mix of explanatory factors for judicial reasoning that cannot be reduced to the pursuit of judges' policy objectives or to the working of discursive constraints. The argument proceeds as follows: Against the background of a brief overview of established views on judicial behaviour, I will present the dissonant perspectives on judicial reasoning as they flow from sociological accounts of legalism on the one hand and from normative accounts of deliberation on the other hand (III). I then introduce judges' audiences and self-presentation theory as a further angle from which to understand judicial reasoning. There are certainly a host of other factors that bear on the way in which judges act and argue. The aim here is to complement those accounts and to correct or refine the views of legalism and deliberation. The main thesis is that selfpresentation theory makes a useful and at times plainly necessary addition to the framework for studying judicial reasoning (IV). The concluding outlook sets out a tentative programme for future research on judicial authority and styles of reasoning that is informed by core social-psychological considerations (V). However, first, the whole argument gains traction from a brief example of establishing judicial authority in international economic law (II).
II. Judicial Authority and Styles of Reasoning: An Example
In a controversial and pivotal decision, a recent investment arbitral tribunal concluded that it had jurisdiction to hear the collective claim of Italian holders of Argentine bonds against the Argentine Republic. 8 The many interesting legal issues that the award touched upon included the interpretation of a so-called cooling-off period. The applicable investment treaty provided that a dispute shall only be subject to international arbitration if it continues to exist 18 months after the commencement of domestic proceedings. law, where a change in ethos from diplomats to lawyers was spotted previously. 18 Above all, these observations stem from lawyers who have a close understanding of the legal field. So far, the insights of those lawyers hardly feed into the studies of political science. I will resume such trends and suggestions for further research in the programmatic outlook on the study of international judges and their audiences. This section continues by presenting the well received but mutually irritating views of legalism and deliberation.
A. Legalism
The notion of legalism captures one of the very influential views on judicial reasoning. Typically a part of grander sociological outlooks, legalism teases out the 'belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent prestige,' which is 'the basis of every system of authority, and correspondingly of every kind of willingness to obey.' 19 When it comes to judicial authority, such basic belief is generally informed by a whole range of factors, including those that pertain to the person of the judge, to the scenery of the courtroom, and to the language of the law. 20 Legalism zooms in on the ethical attitude, which informs a willingness to obey, and which links up closely with the practice of the law. In Judith Shklar's seminal contribution, legalism refers to 'the ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule following, and moral relationships to consist of duties and rights determined by rules.'
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With regard to judicial authority and styles of legal reasoning, legalism suggests with a lasting legacy that especially when their authority threatens to be disputed, judges would do their best to portray their practice as impeccable rule-following. If waters get rough, the law and the rules of legal reasoning appear to offer the best refuge. Judges tie themselves to the law not so much to resist any temptation of submitting to reasons of politics, morality or economics but to say compellingly that their hands are tied. They speak the law, so help them God.
With additional nuances and variations, this basic ethos of legalism-and the way it turns into an appeal to formalism for judges-finds support and further explanations in many sociological studies of judicial behaviour and reasoning. Niklas Luhmann argues in his masterful Legitimität durch Verfahren that the whole point of judicial procedure is to first reduce any kind of broader conflict into a specific and technical question about the law in a concrete case and to then blend out the role of the judge as actually taking a decision. 22 For Shklar, the 'aloofness from politics' is likewise a key ingredient of adjudicators' social legitimacy. 23 The phenomenon of legalism finds recognition not only in works with primarily sociological ambitions but likewise resonates in legal philosophical arguments. Jeremy Waldron's critique of judicial review takes off on the basis that normative disagreement is stifled in the courtroom. Meaningful differences get lost when they are reduced into differences of interpretation: 'Instead of encouraging us to confront these disagreements directly, judicial review is likely to lead to their being framed as questions of interpretation of those bland formulations.' 24 Waldron thus acknowledges the pervasive appeal of legalism and articulates a normative critique. In sum, legalism highlights the appearance of impeccable rule following, overshadowing choices, and blending out the judge as an actor.
B. Deliberation
From a more decidedly legal-philosophical perspective, the sociological phenomenon of legalism can gain quite some support. Explaining this support requires a walk through venerable political philosophy at a rather high speed. This analysis will quickly reconnect to judicial authority and styles of reasoning. 27 Notably and in contrast to a sociological study of legitimacy, the issue is not whether subjects are willing to obey (referring to internal motivation) but whether they can justifiably be forced to obey. The features of parliament, which connects both to the public sphere and to ideas of representation, make it the focal point for legally programming the administrative power of the state.
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Other institutions, administrations and courts draw on the legitimacy thus fed into the law.
With reference to Jerry Meshaw, Habermas speaks of the 'transmission belt model,' in which the law transports legitimacy from the public sphere and elections through the parliament into the practice of the state. 32 Habermas' discourse theoretical reconstruction of the law in democratic constitutional states certainly does not believe that the law is determinate to the extent that courts or administrations -from now on I leave aside the latter -are programmed like robotic puppets.
Parties typically find themselves before the court because the law has run out. According to
Habermas, what the procedure before court and ultimately, the judicial decision need to do is complete the legislative programme. Following Ronald Dworkin, they do so in a creative and constructive fashion. However, unlike Dworkin, they are engaged in a cooperative enterprise in which the process of arguing, which is structured by judicial procedures, bears the burden of completing the legislative programme, rather than any ideal judge with supernatural powers.
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However, before court, the discourse is in principle limited to a more narrow set of possible reasons. The limits are loosely confined by the rules of interpretation. 34 What I take from the 30 Habermas, supra note 4 at 127. 31 Habermas, supra note 4 at 170. as one between types of discourses already takes into account that a mechanical separation of lawmaking and law application is not tenable. Beyond that, Habermas keenly recognises that a number of general socio-legal trends contribute to types of law that shift ever greater chunks of law-making from the legislature to the executive and judicial branches of the state. 36 In light of this development,
Habermas writes:
to the extent that legal programs are in need of further specification by the courts . . . juristic discourses of application must be visibly supplemented by elements taken from discourses of justification.
Naturally, these elements of a quasi-legislative opinion-and will-formation require another kind of legitimation than does adjudication proper. The additional burden of legitimation could be partly satisfied by additional obligations before an enlarged critical forum specific to the judiciary. 37 While developing his discourse-theoretical approach to the separation of powers and to adjudication, Habermas clearly has in view the democratic constitutional context of national legal 35 Habermas, supra note 4 at 172. 36 His emphasis actually falls on bureaucracies and agencies rather than courts. 37 Habermas, supra note 4 at 439-440 (italics added); see also In the present paper, I suggest focusing on the qualified demand that the 'juristic discourse of application must be visibly supplemented by elements taken from discourses of justification.' For one, there is a question on that same political-philosophical terrain: Would that approach actually be well justified and advisable? Would it be conducive to the legitimacy of adjudication? An answer hinges, not the least, on the additional means of legitimation, which might include lower thresholds of participation in judicial proceedings, as well as greater transparency and publicness, for instance.
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The answer also depends, as Habermas highlights, on the role of 'an enlarged critical forum specific to the judiciary,' which is supposed to contribute additional legitimacy through its critique of judicial reasoning. Is that at all possible, and is it advisable? There is a clear tension between this proposition and the core idea of legalism. Legalism would suggest that when the law runs out and the legal programme requires further specification, the adjudicators find themselves in a moment of crisis.
The ground opens up under their feet, and they try their best to hold on to any and every branch of the law that is just within reach. They seek refuge in formalism. However, precisely in those moments, formalism is weakest. As Judith Shklar summarises: 'as denunciations of "lawmaking" 38 More specifically, he focuses on the German constitutional order, with some detours via the US-American To refine the discussion of both legalism and deliberation, this section introduces in further detail a third perspective from which to approach judicial reasoning, namely that of self-presentation theory and its emphasis on impression management (A). I submit that such an approach is already subtly present in Shklar's legalism. This approach must be amplified and then used to reconsider arguments about judicial reasoning from the view of social legitimacy (B). Drawing attention to judges' audiences also has implications for the possibly critical and legitimating role of an enlarged forum specific to the judiciary (C).
A. Audiences
Audiences matter to judges for a variety of reasons, including because 'judges, like other people, get satisfaction from perceiving that other people view them positively.' 43 Being seen favourably can serve strategic ends, for example, if people who form part of the audience are in a position in which they might bear on the future career of a judge or on the judges' preferred policy outcome. In short, audiences can be instrumental. However, suggesting that being seen favourably gives satisfaction also endows audiences with a self-sufficient role that is not linked to further objectives. Laurence Baum, who pioneered thinking about judges and their audiences in domestic settings, maintains that 'judges care about the regard of salient audiences because they like that regard in itself, not just as a means to other ends'.
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The argument is one of social-psychology, which can be further refined though the lens of selfpresentation theory. This strand of thinking sees behaviour as an extension of the impressions that actors are trying to create in the eyes of their audiences. 45 Erving Goffman, whose work set self-42 Shklar, supra note 21 at 13. the perceived probability of success. Social anxiety increases the more it matters to an actor to convey a particular impression and the less likely she perceives her success to be.
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From this angle, judicial reasoning is part of the repertoire with which judges attempt to manage their impressions. 52 Judges tackle anxieties with the art of impression management. Whether they succeed-given that they place a constant level of importance on imposing a particular impression-depends on the degree to which they master the art of impression management and also on the audience they are trying to impress. reasons that all three arbitrators in the initial example were convinced that they were doing 'the right thing.' What self-presentation theory suggests is that judges also want to be seen to do the right thing, at least by those whose opinion they value. In addition, this theory suggests that the interaction with audiences influences what actors believe to be appropriate. Thus, this theory opens up a 51 Ibid. at 361-2. 52 Goffman, supra note 47 at 160 ('the role of expression is conveying impressions of self'). democracies that standards and practices of the legal profession shape judicial reasoning and continue to strengthen the ties that bind judges to the law.
Performance.

59
Formalism is a contingent refuge. As the example already shows, it is not a destination that every judge chooses. Its appeal depends on the beliefs of a judge's audience. The practice of 56 Shklar, supra note 21 at 12.
57 Shklar, supra note 21 at 13 (italics added).
58 Shklar, supra note 21 at 12. 59 Facts and Norms 224-5 adjudication knows many other decisions for which formalism was not the preferred style of impression management. Adjudication in international criminal law offers many examples, but so does the law of the sea. 60 In its first case, then split into two, the majority of the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) upheld its jurisdiction by arguing inter alia that 'it would not be consistent with justice if the Tribunal were to decline to deal with the merits of the dispute.' 61 The boundaries of what is permissible in legal argument and which styles of legal reasoning in fact support judicial authority or detract from it is contingent on the predilection of relevant audiences.
C. Reconsidering Deliberation
What do self-presentation theory and its emphasis on the role of audiences say in relation to a normative account of the style of reasoning? The proposition here was that the additional need for legitimacy in judicial proceedings, which arises when discourses are opened up to include discourses of norm justification (such as fairness, for instance), 'could be partly satisfied by additional obligations before an enlarged critical forum specific to the judiciary.' 62 Whether that approach works depends on the features and general quality of the respective forum.
On a first account, understanding judicial reasoning as a technique for impression management could be twisted to support the controlling and legitimating role of a critical public.
Judges anticipate the reaction to their decisions and reasoning when attempting to deal with their social anxiety. This take on their practice recognises the power and influence of their onlookers.
However, an overall pessimistic view prevails; the implied attitude is one of anticipation and appeasement, rather than one of good arguments that should convince.
The crucial normative question is whether the audiences, which are relevant for specific judges or for specific judicial institutions, constitute a public that has the capacity to generate legitimating and politically efficacious public. 63 Who participates in debates on what terms matters, as does whether public officials are at all accountable to such a public. According to Fraser, public sphere theory has overwhelmingly bought into implicit assumptions of rather hermetic nation states that align the scope of authority with a public that ties together equal members of a political community. 64 Within territorial borders, national language and media outlets nourish life in the public sphere. Finally, as citizenry, the public can be politically efficacious. There is public authority that reacts to the public. All of this of course changes in the post-national constellation, where authority, territory and rights fall apart. 65 Fraser suggests that regardless of political citizenship, those individuals must be included on an equal footing and be granted channels of influence that are 'subject[ed] to a structure of governance that set the ground rules for their interaction. For any given problem, accordingly, the relevant public should match the reach of the governance structure that regulates the relevant swath of social interaction.' 66 Of course, that is a high threshold. Not the least, massive inequality and mechanisms of exclusion stand in the way. Euphoric references to the internet as a medium that gives rise to new transnational public spaces are contrasted with the fact that the internet still only reaches less than a third of the world population (2 of roughly 7 billion people). 67 Whether such spaces at all qualify is also contested with good arguments. with the authority that it is subjected to while at the same time forming a community of sufficient quality to realise inclusive participation on par and a discourse of some density. The related and most important problem appears more clearly if considered from the perspective of judges and their audiences; there is an idea of openness embedded in the public sphere that together with inclusiveness as to who participates, suggests that themes may not in principle be excluded or perspectives be ab initio weighted. The idea is that of generality, which is typically linked to the process of law creation in parliament. This idea demands that procedures be thematically unsettled and open to all kinds of competing perspectives. 69 The problem is that adjudication at the international level is clearly thematically fragmented. Discourses are equally fragmented so that any forum that is specific to a judiciary brings specific perspectives that favour one point of view over another. 70 Such fragmentation impacts how judges deal with their social anxiety and manage their impressions. Arguments tend to be geared more towards groups that share a specific perspective. The present contribution has attempted to show how thinking about judges' quest for authority and about styles of judicial reasoning gains from a closer consideration of judges' audiences. This work has challenged explanations and justifications of judicial reasoning in the forms of legalism and deliberation by drawing attention to judges' self-presentation and impression management. It has tried to give a first account of how judges' audiences matter. Granted, a number of questions remain.
I hope that curiosity to explore these questions further also remains. In this concluding outlook, I
wish to contrast the study of audiences with closely competing alternatives, especially those of epistemic or interpretative communities. Further, there is of course the key question of what audiences are relevant. Moreover, differences between domestic and international contexts must be considered further.
A. Audiences rather than epistemic or interpretative communities
The view of the practice of adjudication that arises from considering judges' self-presentation between legalism and deliberation might also be understood from the perspectives of the closely competing ideas of epistemic or interpretative communities. I submit that for a number of reasons, thinking about judges' audiences fares better.
The first notion-that of epistemic communities-refers to 'a network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain.' 73 Members of an epistemic community have 'a shared set of causal and principled (analytic and normative) beliefs, a consensual knowledge base, and a common policy enterprise (common interests) that distinguishes epistemic communities from various other groups.' 74 The notion is highly ambitious and demanding, as it includes members that share all of these things. To argue that audiences matter, it is not necessary to buy into all or even any of these elements. Self-presentation theory is both less demanding and more nuanced. It allows for a whole range of sincere and also cynical motivations.
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The notion of interpretative communities is also less demanding. 78 This way of looking at interpretative practice is complementary to that of considering audiences. However, the latter approach has the additional advantage of zooming in on the perspective of the actor. It is thus able to contribute to explaining the stabilising dynamics of an interpretative community by highlighting the varying motives of the interpreter. The interpreter wants to be seen as being a good member of a community-she wants to please her audience.
B. The power of audiences at the international level
The have already highlighted that at least in some contrast to the domestic setting, adjudication is much more fragmented along thematic lines. Second, it only happens rarely-though increasingly-that international adjudication is taken up in the public media. Relevant audiences are likely to be rather limited to professionals, more specifically, legal professionals in a specific field of law. questions the possibly legitimating role that audiences could play. To the contrary, drawing attention to the role of judges' audiences in the construction of their authority and styles of reasoning may even highlight and explain how international law is pushed in directions that follow the interests and inclinations of specific regimes. The question then is whether inclusive publics emerge that contest those moves. Evidence suggests that they do.
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For instance, in trade law, jurisprudence and styles of reasoning have shifted visibly and significantly in reaction to widespread criticism to decisions that seemingly categorically rule out the possibility that unilateral trade-restrictive measures could be justified by the environmental objectives they pursued. 81 Public contestation played its role in changing that view. This factor points to shifts in adjudicators' strategic space. A change in adjudicators-with the new Appellate Body and its general public international lawyers-also came with a shift in the audiences that mattered. The pivotal and programmatic decisions clearly speak a different language that is geared towards different interlocutors. 82 While much is currently in flux in the field of investment arbitration, it is safe to say that public contestation has drawn the field out into the open, where the argumentative space has already shifted. 80 Michael Zürn, 'The politicization of world politics and its effects: Eight propositions' (2014) 6 European
